The wide variety of small, computationally weak devices, and the growing number of computationally intensive tasks makes the delegation of computation to large data centers a desirable solution. However, computation outsourcing is useful only when the returned result can be trusted, which makes verifiable computation (VC) a must for such scenarios. In this work we extend the definition of verifiable computation in two important directions: public delegation and public verifiability, which have important applications in many practical delegation scenarios. Yet, existing VC constructions based on standard cryptographic assumptions fail to achieve these properties.
Introduction
In the modern age of cloud computing and smartphones, asymmetry in computing power seems to be the norm. Computationally weak devices such as smartphones gather information, and when they need to store the voluminous data they collect or perform expensive computations on their data, they outsource the storage and computation to a large and powerful server (a "cloud", in modern parlance). Typically, the clients have a pay-per-use arrangement with the cloud, where the cloud charges the client proportional to the effort involved in the computation.
One of the main security issues that arises in this setting is -how can the clients trust that the cloud performed the computation correctly? After all, the cloud has the financial incentive to run an extremely fast but incorrect computation (perhaps, once in a while), freeing up valuable compute time for other transactions. Is there a way to verifiably outsource computations, where the client can, without much computational effort, check the correctness of the results provided by the cloud? Furthermore, can this be done without requiring much interaction between the client and the cloud? This is the problem of non-interactive verifiable computation, which was considered implicitly in the early work on efficient arguments by Kilian [19] and computationally sound proofs (CS proofs) by Micali [22] , and which has been the subject of much attention lately [1-4, 9, 11, 14, 15] .
The starting point of this paper is that while the recent solutions consider and solve the bare-bones verifiable computation problem in its simplest form, there are a number of desirable features that they fail to achieve. We consider two such properties -namely, public delegatability and public verifiability.
Public Delegatability. Everyone should be able to delegate computations to the cloud. In some of the protocols [1, 3, 9, 11] , a client who wishes to delegate computation of a function F is required to first run an expensive pre-processing phase (wherein her computation is linear in the size of the circuit for F) to generate a (small) secret key SK F and a (large) evaluation key EK F . This large initial cost is then amortized over multiple executions of the protocol on different inputs x i , and the client needs the secret key SK F in order to initiate each such execution. In other words, clients can delegate computation to the cloud only if they put in a large initial computational investment. This makes sense only if the client wishes to run the same computation on many different inputs. Can clients delegate computation without having to make such a large initial commitment of resources?
As an example of a scenario where this might come in handy, consider a clinic with a doctor and a number of lab assistants, which wishes to delegate the computation of a certain expensive data analysis function F to a cloud service. Although the doctor determines the structure and specifics of F, it is in reality the lab assistants that come up with inputs to the function and perform the delegation. In this scenario, we would like to ask the doctor to run the (expensive) pre-processing phase once and for all, and generate a (small) public key PK F and an evaluation key EK F . The public key lets anyone, including the lab assistants, delegate computation of F to the cloud, and verify the results. Thus, once the doctor puts in the initial investment, any of the lab assistants can delegate computations to the cloud without the slightest involvement of the doctor. Needless to say, the cloud cannot cheat even if it knows the public key PK F .
Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [14] present a publicly delegatable verifiable computation protocol (In fact, their protocol does not require a pre-processing phase) for functions in the complexity class NC (namely, functions that can be computed by circuits of depth polylog(n)). However, as mentioned above, the protocols in [1, 3, 9, 11] are not publicly delegatable. Computationally sound proofs achieve public delegatability, however the known constructions of CS proofs are either in the random oracle model [22] , or rely on non-standard "knowledge of exponent" type assumptions [4, 15] . Indeed, this seems to be an inherent limitation of solutions based on CS proofs since Gentry and Wichs [12] showed recently that CS proofs cannot be based on any falsifiable cryptographic assumption (using a black-box security reduction). Here, we are interested in standard model constructions, based on standard (falsifiable) cryptographic assumptions. Public Verifiability. In a similar vein, the delegator should be able to produce a (public) "verification key" that enables anyone to check the cloud's work. In the context of the example above, when the lab assistants delegate a computation on input x, they can also produce a verification key V K x that will let the patients, for example, obtain the answer from the cloud and be able to check the correctness of the answer. Neither the lab assistants nor the doctor need to be involved in the verification process. Needless to say, the cloud cannot cheat even if it knows the verification key V K x .
Neither the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum protocol [14] nor any of the later works [1, 3, 9, 11] seem to be publicly verifiable. In fact, we are not aware of any non-interactive verifiable computation protocol (for a general class of functions) secure in the standard model which provides both public delegatability and public verifiability.
Put together, a verifiable computation protocol that is both publicly delegatable and publicly verifiable is called a public verifiable computation protocol. Note that we still require the party who performs the initial function preprocessing (the doctor in the example above) to be trusted by those delegating inputs and verifying outputs. In addition, those verifying results must trust the party (e.g., the lab assistant) that provided the verification key.
As a bonus, a public verifiable computation protocol is immune to the "rejection problem" that affects the constructions of [1, 9, 11] . A problem with the protocols of [1, 9, 11] is that they do not provide reusable soundness, i.e. a malicious cloud that is able to observe the result of the verification procedure (namely, the accept/reject decision) on polynomially many inputs can eventually break the soundness of the protocolthis is called the "rejection problem". It is an easy observation that public verifiable computation protocols do not suffer from the rejection problem. Roughly speaking, the reason is that verification in such protocols depends only on the public key and some (instance specific) randomness generated by the delegator, and not on any long-term secret state. Thus, obtaining the result of the verification procedure on one instance does not help break the soundness on a different instance. This paper is concerned with the design of public (non-interactive) verifiable computation protocols.
Our Results and Techniques
Our main result is a (somewhat surprising) connection between the notions of attribute-based encryption (ABE) and verifiable computation (VC). In particular, we show that any attribute-based encryption scheme for a class of functions F (that is closed under complement) can be used to construct a public verifiable computation protocol for F .
Attribute based encryption schemes, a notion introduced by Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters [16, 24] , are a generalization of identity based encryption where secret keys ABE.SK F associated to (Boolean) functions F can decrypt ciphertexts that encrypt a message m under "identity" x if and only if F(x) = 1. By now, there have been a number of constructions of ABE schemes for various classes of functions, the most general being an ABE scheme where F is any function that can be computed by a polynomial-size Boolean formula [16, 20] . The core idea of our construction is simple: attribute-based encryption schemes naturally provide a way to "prove" that F(x) = 1. Say the server is given the secret key ABE.SK F for a function F, and a ciphertext that encrypts a random message m under the identity x. The server will succeed in decrypting the ciphertext and recovering m if and only if F(x) = 1. If F(x) = 0, he fares no better at finding the message than a random guess. The server can then prove that F(x) = 1 by returning the decrypted message.
More precisely, this gives an effective way for the server to convince the client that F(x) = 1. The preprocessing phase for the function F generates a master public key ABE.MPK for the ABE scheme (which acts as the public key for the verifiable computation protocol) and the secret key ABE.SK F for the function F (which acts as the evaluation key for the verifiable computation protocol). Given the public key and an input x, the delegator encrypts a random message m under the "identity" x and sends it to the server. If F(x) = 1, the server manages to decrypt and return m but otherwise, he returns ⊥. Now,
• If the client gets back the same message that she encrypted, she is convinced beyond doubt that F(x) = 1. This is because, if F(x) were 0, the server could not have found m (except with negligible probability, assuming the message is long enough).
• However, if she receives no answer from the server, it could have been because F(x) = 0 and the server is truly unable to decrypt, or because F(x) = 1 but the server intentionally refuses to decrypt. Thus, we have a protocol with one-sided error -if F(x) = 0, the server can never cheat, but if F(x) = 1, he can.
A verifiable computation protocol with no error can be obtained from this by repeating the above protocol twice, once for the function F and once for its complementF. A verifiable computation protocol for functions with many output bits can be obtained by repeating the one-bit protocol above for each of the output bits.
The key observation about this protocol is that the client's computation is polynomial in the length of its input x, the length of the public key PK F and the security parameter -none of which depend on the complexity of the function F being evaluated. Thus, the client's computational complexity is independent of the complexity of the function F. Furthermore, with existing ABE schemes, the computation done by both the client and the worker is significantly cheaper than in any previous scheme, since we avoid the overhead of PCPs and FHE.
Thus far, most ABE schemes [16, 24] are proven secure only in a selective-security model. As a result, instantiating the protocol above with such a scheme would inherit this limitation. While it is believed that the ABE scheme of Goyal et al. [16] can be proven adaptively secure in the generic group model [26] , the only scheme currently known to be adaptively secure is that of Lewko et al. [20] . Unfortunately, the protocol expands the attribute space such that there is essentially one attribute per instance of each variable in the Boolean formula. Thus, the amount of work required to generate an encryption is proportional to the size of the formula, making this scheme unattractive for outsourcing computation. Nonetheless, given the amount of interest in and effort devoted to new ABE schemes, we expect further improvements in both the efficiency and security of these schemes. Our result demonstrates that such improvements will benefit verifiable computation as well.
Multi-Function Verifiability and ABE with Outsourcing. The definition of verifiable computation focuses on the evaluation of a single function over multiple inputs. In many constructions [3, 9, 11] the evaluated function is embedded in the parameters for the VC scheme that are used for the input processing for the computation. Thus evaluations of multiple functions on the same input would require repeated invocation for the ProbGen algorithm. A notable difference are approached based on PCPs [4, 14, 15] that may require a single offline stage for input processing and then allow multiple function evaluations. However, such approaches inherently require verification work proportional to the depth of the circuit, which is at least logarithmic in the size of the function and for some functions can be also proportional to the size of the circuit. Further these approaches employ either fully homomorphic encryption or private information retrieval schemes to achieve their security properties.
Using the recently introduced definition of ABE with outsourcing [17] we achieve multi-function verifiable computation scheme that decouples the evaluated function from the parameters of the scheme necessary for the input preparation. This VC scheme provides separate algorithms for input and function preparation, which subsequently can be combined for multiple evaluations. The verification algorithm for the scheme is very efficient and its complexity is linear in the output size but independent of the input length and the complexity of the computation. Multi-function VC provides significant efficiency improvements whenever multiple functions are evaluated on the same input, since a traditional VC scheme would need to invoke ProbGen for every function.
Attribute-Based Encryption from Verifiable Computation. We also consider the opposite direction of the ABE-VC relation: can we construct an ABE scheme from a VC scheme? In Appendix B, we show that we can indeed construct an ABE scheme from a VC scheme with a weak form of multi-function verifiability. Both VC schemes that we present in this paper can be modified so that they achieve the weak verifiability notion, and hence they can be used to instantiate the ABE construction.
Related Work
The goal of a VC scheme is to provide a way to efficiently verify work that has been outsourced to an untrusted party. Solutions for this problem have been proposed in various settings. These include interactive proofs [10, 14, 21, 25] and interactive arguments [6, 18, 22] . However, in the context of delegated computation, a non-interactive approach for verifiability is much more desirable. CS proofs [22] realize a non-interactive argument in the random oracle model where the verification work is logarithmic in the complexity of the computation performed by the worker. Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [14] construct a two message (non-interactive) protocol for functions in NC, where the verifier's running time depends on the depth of the circuit for the evaluated function.
The first solutions that provide verifiable computation schemes secure in the standard model for any polynomial-time computable function are the works of Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [11] and Chung, Kalai, and Vadhan [9] . Both constructions employ fully homomorphic encryption for the evaluation of the delegated function, and neither can safely provide oracle access to the verification algorithm. This problem is resolved by Chung et al. [8] , who consider the setting of memory delegation, where all inputs are preprocessed and given to the worker who will later execute multiple computations on them. Similar to the noninteractive solution of Goldwasser et al. [14] , the effort required to verify results from memory delegation is proportional to the depth of the computation's circuit, which for certain functions may be proportional to the circuit size (e.g., exponentiation). The recent works of Bitansky et al. [4] and Goldwasser et al. [15] also achieve reusable soundness, though they rely on non-falsifiable "knowledge of exponent" type assumptions to so. Specifically, Bitansky et al. [4] present a construction for succinct non-interactive arguments based on a combination of PCP and PIR techniques, while Goldwasser et al. [15] give a construction for designated verifier CS proofs for polynomial functions, which also employs leveled fully homomorphic encryption.
Barbosa and Farshim [2] construct a verifiable computation protocol for arbitrary functions (without the rejection problem) from fully homomorphic encryption and functional encryption. Similar to the proposal of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [1] , their protocol calculates a verifiable MAC over the computation's result, allowing efficient verification. However, this approach relies on powerful functional encryption functionality (e.g., the ability to compute MACs) that are currently not known to be achievable, whereas our approach needs only ABE.
The solutions of Benabbas, Gennaro, and Vahlis [3] and Papamanthou, Tamassia, and Triandopoulos [23] provide verifiable computation schemes for smaller classes of functions, polynomials and set operations respectively, but using more efficient tools than FHE or PCP combined with a single server PIR. Although VC schemes with reusable soundness protect against cheating even when the worker learns the output of the verification algorithm, they do not provide public verifiability where anyone can check the correctness of the result. The only exception is the work of Papamanthou et al. [23] which allows anyone who receives the result of the set operation to verify its correctness.
Definitions
We propose extended definitions for verifiable computation. We also summarize definitions for attributebased encryption, since we explore its relationship with verifiable computation.
Public Verifiable Computation
Verifiable computation schemes enable a client to outsource the computation of a function F to an untrusted worker, and verify the correctness of the results returned by the worker [3, 9, 11, 14, 22] . Critically, the outsourcing and verification procedures must be significantly more efficient for the client than performing the computation by itself.
We propose two new properties of verifiable computation schemes, namely • Public Delegation, which allows arbitrary parties to submit inputs for delegation, and
• Public Verifiability, which allows arbitrary parties (and not just the delegator) to verify the correctness of the results returned by the worker. Together, a verifiable computation protocol that satisfies both properties is called a public verifiable computation protocol. The following definition captures these two properties.
Definition 1 (Public Verifiable Computation)
A public verifiable computation scheme V C pub is a fourtuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) which work as follows:
randomized key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and the function F, and outputs a short public key PK that will be used for input delegation and a public evaluation key EK F , which will be used for the evaluation of the function F (the length of this key will depend on the function).
The problem generation algorithm uses the public key PK F to encode the function input x as a public value σ x , which is given to the worker to compute with, and a public value V K x , which is used for verification. The changes relative to the original definition of verifiable computation [11] are with respect to KeyGen, ProbGen and Verify. In the original definition, KeyGen produced a secret key that was used as an input to ProbGen. ProbGen, in turn, produced a secret verification value needed for Verify; that verification value could not be shared with the worker. Indeed, previous schemes for general verifiable computation [9, 11] could be attacked given just oracle access to the verification function. This could be remedied by requiring the client to generate new parameters for the scheme, whenever the worker is caught cheating, but this is unattractive, given the computational overhead of generating parameters. A public verification key, in contrast, allows any party holding it to verify a computational result, even if the party that originally ran ProbGen is no longer online. Thus, this definition is strictly stronger than the earlier notion of security with verification access [11] , which only gives the worker access to a verification oracle.
Providing public delegation and verifiability for outsourced computations introduces a new threat model in which the worker will be able to run the verification algorithm on any output that it intends to return. Accordingly, we modify the original security definition for verifiable computation [11] and require that even if the adversary can run ProbGen on his own, and he receives the verification key for the challenge input, he still cannot return an incorrect output that passes verification.
Definition 2 (Public Verifiable Computation Security)
be a public verifiable computation scheme.
In the experiment above, we define the advantage of an adversary A, running in probabilistic polynomial time and making a polynomial number of queries q, as:
where negl() is a negligible function of its input.
Efficiency requirements. For outsourcing work via verifiable computation to make sense, the client must to less work than that done by the worker. Thus, we retain the earlier efficiency requirements [11] ; namely ProbGen and Verify must have smaller computational complexity than Compute. However, for KeyGen, we ask only that the complexity be O(|F|); thus, we employ an amortized complexity model, in which the client invests a larger amount of computational work in an offline phase in order to obtain efficiency during the online phase. [11] . Hence any scheme satisfying Definition 2 will also satisfy the earlier definition.
Remark 1 Definition 2 is strictly stronger than the original definition of verifiable computation

Multi-Function Verifiable Computation
The original definition of verifiable computation [11] assumed that multiple inputs would be prepared for a single function; here, we expand this definition to efficiently allow workers to verifiably apply multiple functions to a single input. In other words, previously, to evaluate F(x) and G(x), the client needed to run KeyGen for F, KeyGen for G, and then run ProbGen on x twice, once for F and once for G (since the public key PK used for the input preprocessing in ProbGen depends on the function that is evaluated). Our new definition only requires the client to run ProbGen once, and yet still allows the client to verify that a particular output was the output of a particular function on a particular input.
We present the multi-function property in the secret key setting of the original definition of verifiable computation [11] , but note that it is orthogonal to the public delegation and verification defined in Section 2.1, and hence a scheme may have both properties, none, or one but not the other.
Since the original definition embeds the function to be computed in the scheme's parameters, we separate the generation of the parameters for the scheme, which will be used in ProbGen, into a Setup stage, and the generation of tokens for the evaluation of different functions into a KeyGen routine, which could be executed multiple times using the same parameters for the scheme. This allows the evaluation of multiple functions on the same instance produced by ProbGen. 
Definition 3 (Multi-Function
We define the adversary's advantage and the scheme's security in the same fashion as Definition 2.
In the experiment, the adversary has oracle access to O KeyGen (F), which calls KeyGen PK param ,SK param (F), returns PK F , and stores SK F . Similarly, the adversary can access the O ProbGen (·) oracle, which calls ProbGen SK param (x), returns σ x , and stores τ x . Eventually, the adversary returns an encodingσ y which purports to be an output of F applied to x. The challenger runs Verify with the corresponding values of τ x and SK F , and the adversary wins if this check passes.
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Introduced by Goyal et al. [16] , Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) can be thought of as associating a function F with each user's key, and a set of attributes with each ciphertext. A key will decrypt a particular ciphertext only if the key's function evaluates to true for the attributes associated with the ciphertext. In this sense, KP-ABE can be thought of as a special-case of Functional Encryption [5] .
Basic KP-ABE
Currently known KP-ABE constructions support functions that are poly-sized Boolean formulas φ in n variables; ciphertexts are associated with attributes of the form z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ {0, 1} n . However, this restricted set of functions is not inherent in the definition of KP-ABE. Thus, we state the following definitions, adapted from the definitions of Goyal et al. [16] and Lewko et al. [20] , in terms of a general policy function. •
Below, we give the natural definition for KP-ABE security. Early KP-ABE schemes were proven secure in the weaker "selective-security" model, but the stronger definition below was recently achieved by Lewko et al. [20] .
Definition 6 (KP-ABE Security) Let ABE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) be a key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme. We define security via the following experiment. 
We define the advantage of the adversary in all valid experiments as
We say that ABE is a secure key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme if Adv A (ABE,U, λ) < negl(λ).
KP-ABE With Outsourcing
Green, Hohenberger, and Waters define a notion of ABE with outsourcing in which the party performing the decryption can offload most of the decryption work to an untrusted third party [17] ; the third party learns nothing about the underlying plaintext, and the party holding the secret key can complete the decryption very efficiently, in time independent of the size of the formula associated with the key. Although they define and construct ABE with outsourcing for both CP-ABE and KP-ABE, below, we focus on the definitions for KP-ABE, which will be relevant for our work. We also give an IND-CPA security definition, since we do not require the stronger RCCA they defined. Note that Green et al.'s construction [17] is selectively secure, but they provide a sketch, based on Lewko et al.'s work [20] , to show that their scheme can also be made adaptively secure. Note that in this context the outsourcing done is for the very specific function of ABE partial decryption. The definitions also do not include a notion of integrity or verification, as in verifiable computation, but instead are concerned with the secrecy of the underlying plaintext.
Definition 7 (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption With Outsourcing [17]) A KP-ABE scheme with
outsourcing, ABE, is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Transform, Dec) defined as follows:
• Setup(λ,U) → (PK, MSK) : Given a security parameter λ and the set of all possible attributes U, output a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
• Enc PK (M, γ) → C: Given a public key PK, a message M, and a set of attributes γ, output ciphertext C. 
• KeyGen MSK (F) → (SK F , T K F ): Given a function F and the master secret key MSK, output a decryption key SK F and a transformation key T K F associated with that function. • Transform T K F (C) → C ∪ ⊥: Given a ciphertext C = Enc PK (M, γ) and a transformation key T K F for function F, output a partially decrypted ciphertext C if F(γ)
In the experiment, the adversary has access to two oracles. 
We say that ABE is a secure key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with outsourcing if Adv
A (ABE,U, λ) < negl(λ).
Public Verifiable Computation from Attribute-Based Encryption
The security definition of KP-ABE guarantees that decryption will only succeed when the function associated with a secret key evaluates to a particular check value (traditionally "1") on the attribute associated with the ciphertext. Seen in this light, we can view the decrypted plaintext value from a KP-ABE ciphertext as an efficiently verifiable proof that the result of applying the key's function to the attribute value is equal exactly to the check value. Thus, in the verifiable computation setting, if we give the worker a key associated with the function we wish to evaluate, then we can encrypt random messages, using as attributes the input values for the computation. The worker's response will simply be the decryptions that he manages to obtain. The only valid plaintext values that he can return will be associated with attributes that satisfy the check value for the function evaluation. We can make this scheme publicly verifiable by defining the verification tokens to be the result of applying a one-way function to the plaintexts. Indeed this transformation applies to any VC scheme in which verification consists of a simple comparison operation.
One problem with this approach is that the worker may still cheat by returning nothing; i.e., claiming that none of the ciphertexts decrypted successfully, even when some did succeed. To address this problem, consider a function f : X → {0, 1} with binary output. We can compute the complement functionf , which always outputs the opposite bit of the output of f . If we give the worker secret keys for both f andf , and encrypt two different random messages, then the worker must return exactly one of the messages, since exactly one of the ciphertexts will always decrypt successfully. To keep the ciphertexts distinct, we generate the keys for f andf (and the corresponding encryptions) using two distinct master keypairs for the KP-ABE system.
To extend this idea to functions with multi-bit outputs, we decompose each function F into subfunctions f 1 , ..., f n where f i represents the function that computes the i th output bit of F. Alternately, if the KP-ABE scheme supports attribute hiding (also known as predicate encryption) and a class of functions that includes MACs, then we can define F (x) = MAC K (F(x)) and verify F instead, similar to the constructions suggested by Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [1] , and Barbosa and Farshim [2] .
An attribute hiding ABE or predicate encryption scheme would also give us input and output privacy, without the need for fully-homomorphic encryption. Attribute hiding naturally gives us input privacy, since we encode the function's input in the attribute. By randomly permuting the keypairs and ciphertexts we give out, we can also hide whether a successful decryption corresponds to a 0 or 1 output.
We present a construction of a public verifiable computation scheme for functions with one bit output from a KP-ABE scheme follow. The extension to multi-bit outputs is straightforward as described above. Then there is a public verifiable computation scheme V C = (VCKeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) for the same class of functions F , which is defined as follows.
Construction 1 (V C
• 
Generate a pair of random messages
(m 0 , m 1 ) R ← {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} λ .
Compute ciphertexts c
Output σ
• Verify V K x (σ y ) → y ∪ ⊥:
Efficiency. To be a true verifiable computation scheme, V C ABE must satisfy the efficiency requirements from Section 2.1; specifically, the running time of ProbGen and Verify must be less than computing the function itself. Since Verify simply requires two one-way function computations and two equality checks, the runtime is independent of the function. For any "reasonable" KP-ABE scheme, the runtime of ProbGen should be independent of F as well, since all of the inputs to Enc are independent of F.
To prove the security of V C ABE , we show that a VC attacker must break the security of the one-way function g or of the KP-ABE scheme. Intuitively, if an adversary can break V C ABE , then he will return the decryption of a message encrypted with an attribute that does not satisfy the function being verified. This decryption can then be used to decide which plaintext was encrypted in the KP-ABE challenge. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A.
Remark 2 If we employ a KP-ABE scheme that is selectively secure, then the construction and proof above still go through, as long as the KP-ABE scheme's attribute domain has size polynomial in the security
parameter. In that case, A ABE simply guesses the attribute the VC adversary will cheat on. Since A VC cheats with non-negligible probability, and the probability that he will cheat at x is 1 poly(λ) , it follows that A ABE will also have non-negligible advantage in the ABE security game.
Remark 3 If we employ a KP-ABE scheme that is selectively secure with a larger domain, then the construction and proof above still go through if we adopt a notion of "selectively-secure" verifiable computation in which the VC adversary commits in advance to the input on which he plans to cheat.
Multi-Function Verifiable Computation from KP-ABE With Outsourcing
The original definition of KP-ABE does not readily lend itself to multi-function verifiable computation. Specifically, it does not allow the client an easy way to verify which function was used to compute an answer. For example, suppose the client gives out keys SK F and SK G for functions F and G. Following Construction 1, to outsource computation on input x, the client gives out (among other things) a ciphertext Enc PK (M 0 , x). Now, suppose F(x) = 1, but G(x) = 1. The worker can use SK F to obtain M 0 , but claim that this output corresponds to a computation of G. In essence, Construction 1 gives us a way to verify that an output corresponds to a particular input, but if we give out more than one secret key, it cannot distinguish between functions. One remedy would be to run two parallel instances of Construction 1, but then we need to run ProbGen for each function we wish to compute on a given input.
A more elegant solution is to use an ABE scheme that requires an extra step to decrypt a ciphertext. Thus, we show how to build multi-function verifiable computation from KP-ABE with outsourcing [17] (see Section 2.3.2). We use the transformation key to allow the worker to compute, and then use the secret key as a verification key for the function. This allows us to verify both the input and specific function used to compute a particular result returned by the worker.
Interestingly, a similar scheme can be constructed from Chase's multi-authority ABE [7] , by using function identifiers (e.g., a hash of the function description, or a unique ID assigned by the client) in place of user identifiers, and using the "user key" generated by the Central Authority as a verification token for a particular function. However, since this approach does not employ the multi-authority ABE scheme in a black-box fashion, in this section, we focus on the construction from KP-ABE with outsourcing.
We specify the construction in detail below. For clarity, we only consider functions with single-bit outputs, but the construction can be generalized just as we did in Section 3.
Construction 2
Let ABE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, TransformDec) be a KP-ABE scheme with outsourcing with attribute universe U. We construct a multi-function verifiable computation scheme as follows:
, whereF is the complement of F.
. In other words, the public key will be the transformation keys, and the secret verification key will be the "true" secret keys.
•
The above construction will provide the efficiency property required for a VC scheme (verification that is more efficient than the delegated computation) as long as the Transform algorithm is computationally more expensive than the Encand Decalgorithms of the ABE scheme. However, this requirement is inherent in the definition of ABE with outsourcing. Proof Intuition. The proof of security looks very similar to Proof A. The intuition for input security is the same as before, i.e., the revelation of one of the two random messages associated with a ProbGen invocation demonstrates that the computation was performed on that particular input. Unlike with a regular ABE scheme, we can also verify the function used, since decrypting with a key that does not match the transformation key used will not produce the expected message. This is provided by the security of the ABE with outsourced decryption, which guarantees semantic security of the encrypted messages even when the adversary sees the transformation keys used for the outsourced portion of the decryption.
Remark 4 Construction 2 is publicly delegatable, since
Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we introduced new notions for verifiable computation: public delegation, public verifiability, and multi-function VC. We demonstrate that ABE implies public VC, and ABE with outsourcing implies multi-function VC. The relationship offers much more efficient VC schemes for the class of functions supported by ABE.
Our work leaves open several interesting problems. First, can we achieve public verifiability for a multifunction VC scheme? Second, it would be desirable to show a MAC scheme that can be supported by an ABE scheme's class of functions, so that we can improve the efficiency of verifying multi-bit outputs.
the distribution is the same as Game 1. Thus, we have:
which implies
Thus, if A VC distinguishes between these two games, then A ABE can distinguish which ciphertext his challenger encrypted with non-negligible probability. Now, since A VC cannot distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1, we can run him in Game 1, and use him to invert the one-way function g. Specifically, suppose we are given z = g(w), and we want to find w.
We run Game 1 with A VC using ABE keys we have generated, and we define m r = w. Thus, we will give A V the value z as the verification token for output r. Since f 1−r (x) = 1, a legitimate worker would return m 1−r , so to cheat in the VC experiment, the A VC must return m r such that g(m r ) = z. In other words, the value σ y he returns must be w, and hence we will invert the one-way function with non-negligible probability. Thus, assuming the ABE scheme and the one-way function are secure, Construction 1 is also secure.
B Attribute-based Encryption from Verifiable Computation
Given that we have shown how to construct a verifiable computation (VC) protocol from an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme, it is natural to ask whether the reverse implication holds. In other words, can we construct an ABE scheme, given a VC scheme? At first sight, the key property of a VC scheme -namely, efficient verification -does not seem to have anything to do with attribute-based encryption. Despite this apparent mismatch of functionality, we show how to transform (publicly) verifiable computation protocols of a special form -that we call weak "multi-function verifiable computation" -into an attribute-based encryption scheme for the same class of functions. Informally, a weak multi-function VC protocol has the following features:
• The output of ProbGen on an input x can be used to compute many different functions on x. Thus, in some sense, ProbGen is agnostic of the function that will be computed on the input. In particular, we now have a setup algorithm that generates a pair of public and secret parameters, a key generation algorithm KeyGen (as before) that generates a secret key SK F for a function F given the secret parameters, and a ProbGen algorithm that (as before) given an input x and the public parameters generates an encoding of x together with a verification key. Thus, ProbGen does not know about F and KeyGen does not know about x. Indeed, this is the crucial property that gives us ABE.
• The verification key for an input x consists of a pair (V K 0 x ,V K 1 x ), and the verification algorithm consists of simply applying some function H to the server's response σ y and checking if it equals V K 0 x or V K 1
x . Indeed, the VC scheme that we constructed from ABE has both the above properties. The high level idea for the construction of an ABE scheme from a multi-function VC scheme is as follows: in order to encrypt a message under a particular attribute (in the ABE scheme), we first generate a key that can be computed only if the output of the server in the VC protocol verifies correctly. Now, decryption of the ciphertext will succeed only if the decryptor correctly performs the evaluation of the key's function on the attribute associated with the ciphertext, and the output value of the computation satisfies the decryption condition, in which case he will have the correct decryption key for the ciphertext.
Put another way, the security of a VC scheme implies it should be difficult for an adversary to produce an output that does not correspond to a legitimate computation of a function on a particular input. If we make decryption of a ciphertext dependent on having a particular output, then the computation possible given a key for the function and an attribute/input either legitimately produces the expected output, allowing decryption of the ciphertext, or produces some other output, and it is infeasible to produce the output necessary to decrypt the ciphertext.
We define the notion of a weak multi-function VC protocol below. The "weakness" in the definition comes from the fact that we only need a multi-function VC scheme that verifies that a particular output is legitimate for some outsourced function (i.e., a function given as input to KeyGen), rather than for a specific function.
Below, we combine these requirements in a single definition, demonstrate that both Constructions 1 and 2 satisfy this definition, and finally show how to use such a definition to construct an ABE scheme. •
The algorithm requires only the public parameters, which are independent of the function that will be computed. It generates both the encoding σ x for the input, and the public verification keys for each possible bit of the output, in this case, simply V K 0
The computation algorithm uses both parts of the public key to produce an encoding of the output y = F(x).
Using the public input-specific value V K x , the verification algorithm outputs 
In the experiment, the adversary has oracle access to O KeyGen (F), which calls KeyGen PK param ,SK param (F), returns PK F , and stores F in the list R . Eventually, the adversary returns an encodingσ y which purports to be an output of some outsourced function applied to x. The challenger runs Verify with the corresponding values of V K x , and the adversary wins if this check passes, but the output does not correspond to the output of one of the functions in list R .
Note that both Constructions 1 and 2 satisfy this definition. Construction 1 does not include any function verification to begin with, but it still verifies that the output, i.e., the message obtained after performing a decryption, could not have been obtained without performing a legitimate computation (decryption) with one of the keys generated by KeyGen. In contrast, Construction 2 is too strong, since it verifies the specific function used. To weaken it, we can simply add the private decryption key SK F to the computation key, which was previously T K F . This removes the ability to verify which function was used, and hence fits within the definition above.
Below, we describe our construction from VC to ABE in more detail. • KeyGen MSK (F) → SK F : Run PK F ← V C .KeyGen PK param ,SK param (F). Output SK F = PK F .
• Dec SK F (C) → M ∪ ⊥: Parse C as (σ x , r, D).
-Run σ ans ← V C .Compute PK params ,PK F (σ x ).
Correctness follows from the fact that if F(x) = 1, then the answer σ ans produced by the server (upon running V C .Compute) is such that H(σ ans ) = V K 1 x . Since H is an injective one-way function, σ ans , r ⊕ D = M.
We now proceed to showing the security of the ABE scheme. First, we state the Goldreich-Levin lemma [13] . Proof Sketch. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an adversary A ABE that wins with non-negligible probability µ the security game from Definition 6. We use this to break the soundness of the VC protocol in two steps, conceptually.
First, using Lemma 1, the existence of A ABE means that there is an adversary that, given a ciphertext of the form (σ x , r, D), predicts an inverse of V K 1 x under the function H. Note that this transformation creates an adversary A ABE that asks polynomially many more ABE secret key queries than A ABE .
Since this adversary essentially predicts the message of the server, this can then be used to construct an adversary A VC that breaks the soundness of the VC protocol (from Definition 10) with non-negligible probability. For completeness, we describe both these transformations as one algorithm A VC that uses A ABE : 
The probability that A VC succeeds in cheating is the same as the probability that A gl succeeds in inverting V K 0 γ = H(σ 0 ). By assumption A ABE wins the security game from Definition 6 with non-negligible probability µ. Therefore A VC returns the correct value for σ 0 · r to A gl with probability µ. Then by Lemma 1 it follows that A gl will compute the correct output σ 0 with probability ε 4 , which is non-negligible. Hence A VC wins the security game from Definition 10 with non-negligible probability. Also A VC runs in polynomial time since A gl is a polynomial-time algorithm.
